Chelsea are reportedly in “pole position” to sign Belgium and Zenit Saint Petersburg midfielder Axel Witsel despite ongoing reports that he is primed for a move to Everton. 

According to Antony Kastrinakis in the Sun, the west London outfit have “leapfrogged the Toffees, Juventus, Inter Milan and Napoli in the race for the Belgium star,” and his arrival at Stamford Bridge could spell the end of Nemanja Matic’s time as a Chelsea player. 

Valued at £28 million, Witsel is predominantly a deep-lying midfield player but can also operate further forward, and Chelsea have “all-but agreed terms” with his agents over a signing, added Kastrinakis.

Everton had previously been on the verge of signing the 27-year-old—and they still could—but Witsel has a history of troublesome transfer dealings, per Belgian football writer Kristof Terreur:

Witsel has only a year left on his current contract with Zenit having moved to the Russian outfit from Benfica in 2012 for €40 million (£32 million).

He has impressed during his time in Russia and has been a regular in the Belgium national team for some time—he started each of their matches at Euro 2016.

Given how surprisingly poor Chelsea’s central-midfield unit of Matic and Fabregas was last season in the Premier League, the Blues were always likely to strengthen over the summer, and incoming manager Antonio Conte is “desperate” to sign Witsel, per Kastrinakis.

Per Bleacher Report’s Dean Jones, Matic was a particularly weak link as Chelsea struggled in 2015-16, and it would not be overly surprising if he left Stamford Bridge for a second time following Witsel’s arrival.

Per David Amoyal, translator for GianlucaDiMarzio.com, Juventus have made inquiries about signing Matic, 27, this summer.

With Paul Pogba potentially set to depart the club, the Old Lady undoubtedly need to strengthen their own central-midfield department, however, Amoyal’s report indicated “Conte has taken [Matic] off the market.”

When winning the Premier League title in 2014-15, Matic was superb for Chelsea, and it looked a masterstroke from then-manager Jose Mourinho that he brought him back to the club for a second time.

Conte may well be confident that he can return the Serbian to his best form under his new regime, but if Juve come in with a good enough offer, he could be tempted to sell.

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A subplot to Italy’s journey through the knockout rounds of the 2016 UEFA European Championship concerned the Nazionale’s future manager.

In April, it was announced that manager Antonio Conte would leave the Azzurri when his two-year contract was up and take the vacant job at Chelsea in the English Premier League.  As the knockout rounds commenced, broadcasters pointed out continually that he was perhaps in his last moments in the job.

There was some backlash around the announcement.  Conte was criticized for walking out on the team in the lead-up to the Euros, and some suggested that his impending departure would cause the team to lose focus.

Such concerns were patently absurd.  National teams play tournaments with the knowledge that their coach is moving on to a new adventure almost every year.  Just two years ago, the Netherlands took third place at the World Cup knowing full well that Louis van Gaal was headed to Manchester United.  A decade ago, the Azzurri themselves won the World Cup knowing that Marcello Lippi would be replaced after the tournament was over.

The tournament’s results certainly show that such concerns were baseless—Conte took a roster devastated by pre-tournament injuries and turned it into the most cohesive unit at Euro 2016.  He’s left the Azzurri with a solid foundation —one that his successor, Giampiero Ventura, can develop as the next generation arrives in Savoy blue.

After shattering expectations at the Euros, it will be difficult to see Conte leave without developing this team any further.  But the former Juventus boss was always likely to go.  He is the kind of coach that thrives on the everyday contact with players that coaching a club provides.

But the ultimate trigger for his departure was certainly his running battle with Italy’s clubs, who consistently blocked his attempts to organize more training camps for the national team outside of FIFA’s designated international calendar.  He was forced to cancel plans for such a camp after the Lega Serie A insisted that players from teams involved in European competition be exempt.

He also lost a battle to have the final of the Coppa Italia played earlier than planned so he could have more time with his charges.  After the quarterfinal loss to Germany, Conte referred to his battles with both the clubs and the media, telling reporters (h/t ESPN FC), “If I’m honest, I never felt supported by anyone.”

Even during official international periods he had issues with some teams—last fall’s spat with Napoli over Lorenzo Insigne, whom the club held back from the national team due to injury claims, may have been a factor in the talented forward’s reduced role in France.

It was clear that he was tired of it.  Rather than be criticized for making his departure so public, he should be praised for giving FIGC president Carlo Tavecchio ample time to search for his replacement.

The FIGC didn’t have such a luxury when Conte took over two years ago—the resignations of team manager Cesare Prandelli and federation president Giancarlo Abete after the team’s World Cup failure left Italian football scrambling.  Once Conte reached his decision, Tavecchio was able to take the time to ensure that he would pick the right man to take the Azzurri forward.

Ventura certainly fits the bill.  While not a flashy pick like coaching stars like Fabio Capello or Carlo Ancelotti would have been, the 68-year-old Genoa native is the perfect man to mold the new generation of Italian internationals and could provide some much-needed continuity as well.

Ventura‘s playing career was about as nondescript as could be.  He grew up in Sampdoria‘s youth system but only ever played one year above Serie D.

He returned to Samp to start his coaching career, working in their youth sector until moving on to the amateur ranks as a head coach.  In 1985 he brought Entella up to the professional leagues and spent the rest of the 1980s and early ’90s with several teams in Serie C1 and C2, the precursors to today’s Lega Pro.

He got his first taste of Serie B in 1993, when he was hired by Venezia, then owned by Maurizio Zamparini.  He finished sixth that first year but couldn’t improve on that finish and was fired after the 1994-95 season—an impressive run, considering Zamparini‘s borderline madness when it comes to sacking his coaches.

In the wake of his departure from Venezia, he dropped back down to Serie C1 and coached Lecce to successive promotions.  But he didn’t helm the southern outfit in Serie A—instead he dropped back down to the second division with Cagliari and quickly led them to the top flight.

This time he was kept on, and he made his Serie A coaching debut with the Isolani in 1997, leading them to an impressive 12th-place finish.

He wouldn’t stay long.  In two years he was back in Serie B with his old club Sampdoria, trying in vain to get them back into the top flight.

For the next 10 years he would bounce around the lower divisions, from Udinese back to Cagliari to a reformed Napoli still picking themselves up from bankruptcy.  He returned to Serie A at Messina in 2005 but couldn’t keep the team out of the relegation zone.

By 2007 he was back in Serie B again, this time with Pisa.  This is where his belated rise to prominence began.

He was impressive in that first season and began to show the first real signs of being able to take talented players and work magic.  He turned an on-loan Alessio Cerci into a rising star and unexpectedly made the promotion playoff.  He was sacked the next year after failing to replicate those results, but his hand in developing the future of the national team was about to begin.

He moved from Pisa to Bari, where he ironically replaced Conte.  He was entrusted with two loanee center-backs from Genoa.  You may know their names: Andrea Ranocchia and Leonardo Bonucci.  They formed an excellent partnership and led the team to a 10th-place finish., and the next summer they had moved on to Inter Milan and Juventus, respectively.  Ranocchia hasn’t quite met the potential he showed under Ventura, but Bonucci has catapulted to superstardom and is quite possibly the best center-back in the world today.

Ventura didn’t last through the entirety of his second season in Bari and was back in the second division by the beginning of the 2011-12 season, when he took over at Torino.  The once-proud Granata had been in Serie B for several years, and Ventura immediately initiated a climb back to the top flight, achieving promotion in his first year.

He was again entrusted with several talented youngsters, many of whom have since evolved into international-level players.  Two Italian players from these Euros, Matteo Darmian and Angelo Ogbonna, came of age with his Granata, as did Poland’s Kamil Glik.

Sought-after left-back Bruno Peres also garnered attention on his watch, and when he got his hands back on Cerci he paired him with Ciro Immobile and turned them into one of the best forward tandems the club had ever seen.  

Even after selling the pair off in the summer of 2014, he brought Torino through the group stage of the ’14-15 Europa League and made the round of 16 with a historic victory over Athletic Bilbao at the San Mames—the first of its kind for an Italian team.

What’s important in all of this is the way he has developed younger players.  Italy is in the midst of a generational shift.  The last vestiges of the last wave of great forwards like Alessandro Del Piero and Francesco Totti are gone, and the likes of Insigne, Federico Bernardeschi, Andrea Belotti (another Ventura disciple from Torino) and Domenico Berardi are going to have to take the reigns.

The defensive line is about to enter a similar phase.  Andrea Barzagli said early last season that the Euros would be his last tournament, and Giorgio Chiellini is 31 years old and has lost important chunks of the last two seasons to injury.  Italy’s center-backs of the future are in place, but Daniele Rugani and Alessio Romagnoli are going to have to be shepherded through the early days of their international careers as well.

Ventura‘s proven track record with bringing players through the ranks makes him perfect to oversee such a fluid moment for the Azzurri.

It also won’t hurt that the tactics Conte instilled over his two years may not change much.  Ventura is very much a disciple of the 3-5-2—according to WhoScored.com, Torino lined up exclusively in that formation last season.  That continuity, plus Ventura‘s familiarity with many of the key contributors in the roster, will cushion the blow of the coaching change, allowing Italy to more easily pick up where they left off and continue to improve.

In getting to the quarterfinals of the Euros—and to do it through the opposition he faced to get there—was a huge accomplishment for Conte.  It’s a shame that he isn’t going to stay to see the seeds he planted bear fruit, but in Ventura he will leave the Azzurri in capable hands that can help shape the team for the future.

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Barcelona are reportedly set to return with another bid for Palmeiras starlet Gabriel Jesus after failing to land him with their initial offer of €19 million plus €5 million in add-ons.

According to Sport‘s Joaquim Piera, the powers that be at the Camp Nou will meet “this coming week” to discuss transfer plans with Jesus being a “focus.” The forward is also said to be pursuing the move himself “and will do his part to force any deal through,” which leaves Barca “confident” they can secure him despite interest from Real Madrid.

He has a €24 million release clause that they are willing to meet, but if possible, the Blaugrana are hoping to pay less than that, as his rights are split between several parties including the player, the club and his agent.

Lastly, Piera adds the Catalan giants are hoping he can form a positive relationship with Neymar while on Brazil duty at the Rio Olympics this summer.

Sports journalist Jonas Giaever believes comparisons between the two are apt:

Indeed, the 19-year-old is similarly blessed with exceptional technical ability, as the following video demonstrates:

If Jesus can follow a similar path to Neymar but add consistency and end product to his game, he could become a huge success. Fox Sports’ Keith Costigan believes he will be:

The youngster’s goal contribution already seems to be improving—after netting four goals in 20 games last year, he already has 12 in 15 this season.

Barca are in need of further cover for their front three, and there are perhaps no better players for him to hone his craft under than Neymar, Lionel Messi and Luis Suarez. He could be an outstanding buy.

Meanwhile, according to Sport‘s Toni Juanmarti, Thomas Vermaelen will become the latest player to depart the Camp Nou upon Samuel Umtiti’s arrival, with the club hoping “to complete a deal next week.”

The Belgian will most likely be heading to Serie A with Roma and Inter Milan interested in signing the centre-back, who Juanmarti noted has a valuation of €10 million.

Vermaelen is only two years into his five-year deal at the Camp Nou, but injury has seen him struggle to make an impact. Indeed, he made just one appearance in his first season and 20 last year.

La Liga writer Andrew Gaffney wondered how he earned a selection for Belgium’s UEFA Euro 2016 squad:

The 30-year-old went on to have a strong tournament, but with Umtiti’s impending arrival, it’s difficult to see where he’ll get game time even if he stays fit.

Providing he can avoid injury, a move to Italy could revitalise his career.

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Barcelona are reportedly set to return with another bid for Palmeiras starlet Gabriel Jesus after failing to land him with their initial offer of €19 million plus €5 million in add-ons.

According to Sport‘s Joaquim Piera, the powers that be at the Camp Nou will meet “this coming week” to discuss transfer plans with Jesus being a “focus.” The forward is also said to be pursuing the move himself “and will do his part to force any deal through,” which leaves Barca “confident” they can secure him despite interest from Real Madrid.

He has a €24 million release clause that they are willing to meet, but if possible, the Blaugrana are hoping to pay less than that, as his rights are split between several parties including the player, the club and his agent.

Lastly, Piera adds the Catalan giants are hoping he can form a positive relationship with Neymar while on Brazil duty at the Rio Olympics this summer.

Sports journalist Jonas Giaever believes comparisons between the two are apt:

Indeed, the 19-year-old is similarly blessed with exceptional technical ability, as the following video demonstrates:

If Jesus can follow a similar path to Neymar but add consistency and end product to his game, he could become a huge success. Fox Sports’ Keith Costigan believes he will be:

The youngster’s goal contribution already seems to be improving—after netting four goals in 20 games last year, he already has 12 in 15 this season.

Barca are in need of further cover for their front three, and there are perhaps no better players for him to hone his craft under than Neymar, Lionel Messi and Luis Suarez. He could be an outstanding buy.

Meanwhile, according to Sport‘s Toni Juanmarti, Thomas Vermaelen will become the latest player to depart the Camp Nou upon Samuel Umtiti’s arrival, with the club hoping “to complete a deal next week.”

The Belgian will most likely be heading to Serie A with Roma and Inter Milan interested in signing the centre-back, who Juanmarti noted has a valuation of €10 million.

Vermaelen is only two years into his five-year deal at the Camp Nou, but injury has seen him struggle to make an impact. Indeed, he made just one appearance in his first season and 20 last year.

La Liga writer Andrew Gaffney wondered how he earned a selection for Belgium’s UEFA Euro 2016 squad:

The 30-year-old went on to have a strong tournament, but with Umtiti’s impending arrival, it’s difficult to see where he’ll get game time even if he stays fit.

Providing he can avoid injury, a move to Italy could revitalise his career.

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Barcelona are reportedly set to return with another bid for Palmeiras starlet Gabriel Jesus after failing to land him with their initial offer of €19 million plus €5 million in add-ons.

According to Sport‘s Joaquim Piera, the powers that be at the Camp Nou will meet “this coming week” to discuss transfer plans with Jesus being a “focus.” The forward is also said to be pursuing the move himself “and will do his part to force any deal through,” which leaves Barca “confident” they can secure him despite interest from Real Madrid.

He has a €24 million release clause that they are willing to meet, but if possible, the Blaugrana are hoping to pay less than that, as his rights are split between several parties including the player, the club and his agent.

Lastly, Piera adds the Catalan giants are hoping he can form a positive relationship with Neymar while on Brazil duty at the Rio Olympics this summer.

Sports journalist Jonas Giaever believes comparisons between the two are apt:

Indeed, the 19-year-old is similarly blessed with exceptional technical ability, as the following video demonstrates:

If Jesus can follow a similar path to Neymar but add consistency and end product to his game, he could become a huge success. Fox Sports’ Keith Costigan believes he will be:

The youngster’s goal contribution already seems to be improving—after netting four goals in 20 games last year, he already has 12 in 15 this season.

Barca are in need of further cover for their front three, and there are perhaps no better players for him to hone his craft under than Neymar, Lionel Messi and Luis Suarez. He could be an outstanding buy.

Meanwhile, according to Sport‘s Toni Juanmarti, Thomas Vermaelen will become the latest player to depart the Camp Nou upon Samuel Umtiti’s arrival, with the club hoping “to complete a deal next week.”

The Belgian will most likely be heading to Serie A with Roma and Inter Milan interested in signing the centre-back, who Juanmarti noted has a valuation of €10 million.

Vermaelen is only two years into his five-year deal at the Camp Nou, but injury has seen him struggle to make an impact. Indeed, he made just one appearance in his first season and 20 last year.

La Liga writer Andrew Gaffney wondered how he earned a selection for Belgium’s UEFA Euro 2016 squad:

The 30-year-old went on to have a strong tournament, but with Umtiti’s impending arrival, it’s difficult to see where he’ll get game time even if he stays fit.

Providing he can avoid injury, a move to Italy could revitalise his career.

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Tactical changes will inevitably be part of the transition between the 2015/16 and 2016/17 seasons at Manchester United. After all, the principle architect of last season’s tactics has been replaced.

Jose Mourinho has arrived in Louis van Gaal’s stead, and he is tasked with addressing two specific tactical issues that resulted in United’s undoing last season.

The first is the plodding, desperately uninspired, safety-first approach to attacking football that caused so much frustration during the first half of last season. The second is the chaotic, rudderless approach to defending that came about when the midfield became less concerned with providing defensive stability.

The first problem was exemplified in games against PSV Eindhoven, CSKA Moscow and Sheffield United at home and Crystal Palace away, which were either 0-0 draws or extremely laboured 1-0 wins.

The second reached its most problematic against Arsenal, Tottenham Hotspur at West Ham United on the road, all games in which United conceded three and were the architects of their own demise.

Van Gaal’s template will obviously be torn up, and Mourinho will write a new one. Thus the bedrock of last season’s tactical approach—using possession and passing to try and work openings, taking as few risks with possession and shape as possible, with the impetus on the forwards to convert an unsustainable percentage of their chances—will be gone.

In its place will come Mourinho-ball.

Sometimes, that will mean a dominant, ruthless aggression against teams United are expected to beat—the essence of his first spell at Chelsea in the Premier League.

Sometimes, it will mean canny counter-attacking against possession-oriented teams with defensive weaknesses—witness Chelsea’s 1-0 win over Manchester City at the Etihad Stadium in February 2014 as a prime example.

And occasionally, it will mean the absolute football-cliche dictionary definition of parking the bus, as embodied by Inter Milan during their Champions League semi-final second-leg win over Barcelona in 2010.

His defensive instincts have perhaps been overstated by that game, which has become a kind of shorthand for his career. The truth is United will play plenty of attacking football under Mourinho, albeit in a different manner than they attempted under Van Gaal.

Michael Cox wrote the following for the Guardian in May: 

Where [Mourinho’s] first Chelsea side were packed with physical midfielders and functional attackers, he has recently accommodated more technical, creative footballers. He has not determinedly searched for a Claude Makelele figure, using the deep-lying playmaker Xabi Alonso at Real Madrid.

The creative but positionally undisciplined Cesc Fabregas played a deep midfield role in his second spell with Chelsea—albeit rarely in big games—and Mourinho also turned Wesley Sneijder and Mesut Ozil into world-class No.10s by freeing them from defensive responsibilities.

The same applies out wide: Mourinho’s most recent left wingers have been Cristiano Ronaldo and Eden Hazard, who have pinned the opposition right-back rather than tracking them.

This take provides food for thought about what could happen at United. There is certainly no Makelele figure in the squad at the moment. Morgan Schneiderlin comes closest, but he was much less effective as the kind of shuffling water-carrier Van Gaal tried to turn him into than the box-to-box player he had been at Southampton.

Van Gaal’s central midfield was endlessly frustrating. They were adept at retaining possession—it became the kind of second nature that the Dutchman’s coaching facilitates—but there was so little urgency, so little attacking impetus.

It repeatedly brought to mind a quote from Marti Perarnau’s Pep Confidential: The Inside Story of Pep Guardiola’s First Season at Bayern Munich (h/t the Telegraph). Guardiola had explained why “tiki-taka” did not describe his approach:

I hate tiki-taka. Tiki-taka means passing the ball for the sake of it, with no clear intention. And it’s pointless.

Don’t believe what people say. Barça didn’t do tiki-taka! It’s completely made up! Don’t believe a word of it! In all team sports, the secret is to overload one side of the pitch so that the opponent must tilt its own defence to cope. You overload on one side and draw them in so that they leave the other side weak.

And when we’ve done all that, we attack and score from the other side. That’s why you have to pass the ball, but only if you’re doing it with a clear intention. It’s only to overload the opponent, to draw them in and then to hit them with the sucker punch. That’s what our game needs to be. Nothing to do with tiki-taka.

Van Gaal played tiki-taka, in the pejorative sense. Those overloads were not created. One of the reasons for this was how often both deep-lying midfielders were stationed behind the ball, even when United were in possession.

Having one or both of those players—assuming Mourinho plays 4-2-3-1—free to break forward more often, providing another passing option for the man on the ball, will be a tactical revelation.

At No. 10, perhaps Juan Mata and Mourinho could work together in spite of their issues at Chelsea—where, incidentally, it seemed Mourinho was not prepared to have a No. 10 freed from defensive responsibility.

There are other options. Zlatan Ibrahimovic could drop into that position, Marcus Rashford played there at youth level and Wayne Rooney, of course, remains a puzzle piece to be accommodated in spite of the lack of an obvious available slot for him.

Henrikh Mkhitaryan’s move to United has been confirmed by Borussia Dortmund (h/t Mark Critchley of  The Independent), and he is certainly an option as an attack-minded No. 10.

On the left, Anthony Martial certainly has potential to be the kind of winger who pins back opposition right-backs—that was just about the only part of United’s attack that was working under Van Gaal before Rashford’s emergence. And Luke Shaw’s return from injury means he will have the support he needs to achieve this.

Shaw was a revelation at full-back before his injury last season and is a virtual archetype for a contemporary left-back: defensively sound with the physical attributes and technical ability required to contribute in attack. His presence will allow Martial a lot of freedom.

And all this should mean Mourinho’s game plan can be executed. It should also mean United’s defence is more solid when the midfield are not offering constant protection. Daley Blind’s role in the side as a play-making centre-back will surely be revised under the new manager, who will likely want to assemble a much more solid centre-back pairing.

When Chelsea beat City at the Etihad in February 2014, Jonathan Wilson broke down the tactics for the Guardian, taking a look at how Chelsea’s centre-backs operated. He wrote: 

Sides such as Bayern Munich and Barcelona deny opponents access to that key sector by pressing high up the pitch, squeezing them back in their own half and then denying them possession. Chelsea do it with guards, stationing [John] Terry and Gary Cahill within the zone—one of the reasons Terry suddenly looks so good again is that he is defending deep, playing with with the game in front of him so his lack of pace and consequent vulnerability to balls played behind him is no longer an issue.

Eric Bailly has already arrived, and it would not be a surprise to see another guard-type defender brought in to play alongside Chris Smalling. Blind will be moved on or used as the kind of utility man he was during 2014-15.

At the tail end of that season, United faced Chelsea. The Red Devils were resurgent. Van Gaal’s influence had finally begun to be felt and United were playing some free-flowing, attack-minded possession football.

They had won four games in a row, which included victories against Manchester City and Liverpool, and they had put themselves in pole position for Champions League qualification. But then they ran into Mourinho’s Chelsea. United dominated possession but lost 1-0.

As Nick Miller observed for ESPN FC at the time: 

Rooney and Van Gaal may think their team dominated the 90 minutes, but that very much depends on your definition of domination. If it means having the majority of the ball and some nice stats, then the United men can take comfort. If it means whose plan did the game most resemble, then Jose Mourinho takes home the moral victory as well as the actual one. United may have controlled possession of the ball, but it was Chelsea who controlled the game.

Van Gaal’s United never again hit a patch of form like they did in the spring of 2015. Almost every other manager in the league adopted the approach Mourinho had done, and Van Gaal never seemed to find a way to beat it.

Now the Red Devils will be the ones using the Mourinho game plan. They will be the ones more likely to hamper their opposition and use counter-attacking as their primary weapon.

To a fanbase worn down by tiki-taka, passing for the sake of passing and possession for the sake of possession, it will likely come as a welcome tactical change.

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Tactical changes will inevitably be part of the transition between the 2015/16 and 2016/17 seasons at Manchester United. After all, the principle architect of last season’s tactics has been replaced.

Jose Mourinho has arrived in Louis van Gaal’s stead, and he is tasked with addressing two specific tactical issues that resulted in United’s undoing last season.

The first is the plodding, desperately uninspired, safety-first approach to attacking football that caused so much frustration during the first half of last season. The second is the chaotic, rudderless approach to defending that came about when the midfield became less concerned with providing defensive stability.

The first problem was exemplified in games against PSV Eindhoven, CSKA Moscow and Sheffield United at home and Crystal Palace away, which were either 0-0 draws or extremely laboured 1-0 wins.

The second reached its most problematic against Arsenal, Tottenham Hotspur at West Ham United on the road, all games in which United conceded three and were the architects of their own demise.

Van Gaal’s template will obviously be torn up, and Mourinho will write a new one. Thus the bedrock of last season’s tactical approach—using possession and passing to try and work openings, taking as few risks with possession and shape as possible, with the impetus on the forwards to convert an unsustainable percentage of their chances—will be gone.

In its place will come Mourinho-ball.

Sometimes, that will mean a dominant, ruthless aggression against teams United are expected to beat—the essence of his first spell at Chelsea in the Premier League.

Sometimes, it will mean canny counter-attacking against possession-oriented teams with defensive weaknesses—witness Chelsea’s 1-0 win over Manchester City at the Etihad Stadium in February 2014 as a prime example.

And occasionally, it will mean the absolute football-cliche dictionary definition of parking the bus, as embodied by Inter Milan during their Champions League semi-final second-leg win over Barcelona in 2010.

His defensive instincts have perhaps been overstated by that game, which has become a kind of shorthand for his career. The truth is United will play plenty of attacking football under Mourinho, albeit in a different manner than they attempted under Van Gaal.

Michael Cox wrote the following for the Guardian in May: 

Where [Mourinho’s] first Chelsea side were packed with physical midfielders and functional attackers, he has recently accommodated more technical, creative footballers. He has not determinedly searched for a Claude Makelele figure, using the deep-lying playmaker Xabi Alonso at Real Madrid.

The creative but positionally undisciplined Cesc Fabregas played a deep midfield role in his second spell with Chelsea—albeit rarely in big games—and Mourinho also turned Wesley Sneijder and Mesut Ozil into world-class No.10s by freeing them from defensive responsibilities.

The same applies out wide: Mourinho’s most recent left wingers have been Cristiano Ronaldo and Eden Hazard, who have pinned the opposition right-back rather than tracking them.

This take provides food for thought about what could happen at United. There is certainly no Makelele figure in the squad at the moment. Morgan Schneiderlin comes closest, but he was much less effective as the kind of shuffling water-carrier Van Gaal tried to turn him into than the box-to-box player he had been at Southampton.

Van Gaal’s central midfield was endlessly frustrating. They were adept at retaining possession—it became the kind of second nature that the Dutchman’s coaching facilitates—but there was so little urgency, so little attacking impetus.

It repeatedly brought to mind a quote from Marti Perarnau’s Pep Confidential: The Inside Story of Pep Guardiola’s First Season at Bayern Munich (h/t the Telegraph). Guardiola had explained why “tiki-taka” did not describe his approach:

I hate tiki-taka. Tiki-taka means passing the ball for the sake of it, with no clear intention. And it’s pointless.

Don’t believe what people say. Barça didn’t do tiki-taka! It’s completely made up! Don’t believe a word of it! In all team sports, the secret is to overload one side of the pitch so that the opponent must tilt its own defence to cope. You overload on one side and draw them in so that they leave the other side weak.

And when we’ve done all that, we attack and score from the other side. That’s why you have to pass the ball, but only if you’re doing it with a clear intention. It’s only to overload the opponent, to draw them in and then to hit them with the sucker punch. That’s what our game needs to be. Nothing to do with tiki-taka.

Van Gaal played tiki-taka, in the pejorative sense. Those overloads were not created. One of the reasons for this was how often both deep-lying midfielders were stationed behind the ball, even when United were in possession.

Having one or both of those players—assuming Mourinho plays 4-2-3-1—free to break forward more often, providing another passing option for the man on the ball, will be a tactical revelation.

At No. 10, perhaps Juan Mata and Mourinho could work together in spite of their issues at Chelsea—where, incidentally, it seemed Mourinho was not prepared to have a No. 10 freed from defensive responsibility.

There are other options. Zlatan Ibrahimovic could drop into that position, Marcus Rashford played there at youth level and Wayne Rooney, of course, remains a puzzle piece to be accommodated in spite of the lack of an obvious available slot for him.

Henrikh Mkhitaryan’s move to United has been confirmed by Borussia Dortmund (h/t Mark Critchley of  The Independent), and he is certainly an option as an attack-minded No. 10.

On the left, Anthony Martial certainly has potential to be the kind of winger who pins back opposition right-backs—that was just about the only part of United’s attack that was working under Van Gaal before Rashford’s emergence. And Luke Shaw’s return from injury means he will have the support he needs to achieve this.

Shaw was a revelation at full-back before his injury last season and is a virtual archetype for a contemporary left-back: defensively sound with the physical attributes and technical ability required to contribute in attack. His presence will allow Martial a lot of freedom.

And all this should mean Mourinho’s game plan can be executed. It should also mean United’s defence is more solid when the midfield are not offering constant protection. Daley Blind’s role in the side as a play-making centre-back will surely be revised under the new manager, who will likely want to assemble a much more solid centre-back pairing.

When Chelsea beat City at the Etihad in February 2014, Jonathan Wilson broke down the tactics for the Guardian, taking a look at how Chelsea’s centre-backs operated. He wrote: 

Sides such as Bayern Munich and Barcelona deny opponents access to that key sector by pressing high up the pitch, squeezing them back in their own half and then denying them possession. Chelsea do it with guards, stationing [John] Terry and Gary Cahill within the zone—one of the reasons Terry suddenly looks so good again is that he is defending deep, playing with with the game in front of him so his lack of pace and consequent vulnerability to balls played behind him is no longer an issue.

Eric Bailly has already arrived, and it would not be a surprise to see another guard-type defender brought in to play alongside Chris Smalling. Blind will be moved on or used as the kind of utility man he was during 2014-15.

At the tail end of that season, United faced Chelsea. The Red Devils were resurgent. Van Gaal’s influence had finally begun to be felt and United were playing some free-flowing, attack-minded possession football.

They had won four games in a row, which included victories against Manchester City and Liverpool, and they had put themselves in pole position for Champions League qualification. But then they ran into Mourinho’s Chelsea. United dominated possession but lost 1-0.

As Nick Miller observed for ESPN FC at the time: 

Rooney and Van Gaal may think their team dominated the 90 minutes, but that very much depends on your definition of domination. If it means having the majority of the ball and some nice stats, then the United men can take comfort. If it means whose plan did the game most resemble, then Jose Mourinho takes home the moral victory as well as the actual one. United may have controlled possession of the ball, but it was Chelsea who controlled the game.

Van Gaal’s United never again hit a patch of form like they did in the spring of 2015. Almost every other manager in the league adopted the approach Mourinho had done, and Van Gaal never seemed to find a way to beat it.

Now the Red Devils will be the ones using the Mourinho game plan. They will be the ones more likely to hamper their opposition and use counter-attacking as their primary weapon.

To a fanbase worn down by tiki-taka, passing for the sake of passing and possession for the sake of possession, it will likely come as a welcome tactical change.

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Tactical changes will inevitably be part of the transition between the 2015/16 and 2016/17 seasons at Manchester United. After all, the principle architect of last season’s tactics has been replaced.

Jose Mourinho has arrived in Louis van Gaal’s stead, and he is tasked with addressing two specific tactical issues that resulted in United’s undoing last season.

The first is the plodding, desperately uninspired, safety-first approach to attacking football that caused so much frustration during the first half of last season. The second is the chaotic, rudderless approach to defending that came about when the midfield became less concerned with providing defensive stability.

The first problem was exemplified in games against PSV Eindhoven, CSKA Moscow and Sheffield United at home and Crystal Palace away, which were either 0-0 draws or extremely laboured 1-0 wins.

The second reached its most problematic against Arsenal, Tottenham Hotspur at West Ham United on the road, all games in which United conceded three and were the architects of their own demise.

Van Gaal’s template will obviously be torn up, and Mourinho will write a new one. Thus the bedrock of last season’s tactical approach—using possession and passing to try and work openings, taking as few risks with possession and shape as possible, with the impetus on the forwards to convert an unsustainable percentage of their chances—will be gone.

In its place will come Mourinho-ball.

Sometimes, that will mean a dominant, ruthless aggression against teams United are expected to beat—the essence of his first spell at Chelsea in the Premier League.

Sometimes, it will mean canny counter-attacking against possession-oriented teams with defensive weaknesses—witness Chelsea’s 1-0 win over Manchester City at the Etihad Stadium in February 2014 as a prime example.

And occasionally, it will mean the absolute football-cliche dictionary definition of parking the bus, as embodied by Inter Milan during their Champions League semi-final second-leg win over Barcelona in 2010.

His defensive instincts have perhaps been overstated by that game, which has become a kind of shorthand for his career. The truth is United will play plenty of attacking football under Mourinho, albeit in a different manner than they attempted under Van Gaal.

Michael Cox wrote the following for the Guardian in May: 

Where [Mourinho’s] first Chelsea side were packed with physical midfielders and functional attackers, he has recently accommodated more technical, creative footballers. He has not determinedly searched for a Claude Makelele figure, using the deep-lying playmaker Xabi Alonso at Real Madrid.

The creative but positionally undisciplined Cesc Fabregas played a deep midfield role in his second spell with Chelsea—albeit rarely in big games—and Mourinho also turned Wesley Sneijder and Mesut Ozil into world-class No.10s by freeing them from defensive responsibilities.

The same applies out wide: Mourinho’s most recent left wingers have been Cristiano Ronaldo and Eden Hazard, who have pinned the opposition right-back rather than tracking them.

This take provides food for thought about what could happen at United. There is certainly no Makelele figure in the squad at the moment. Morgan Schneiderlin comes closest, but he was much less effective as the kind of shuffling water-carrier Van Gaal tried to turn him into than the box-to-box player he had been at Southampton.

Van Gaal’s central midfield was endlessly frustrating. They were adept at retaining possession—it became the kind of second nature that the Dutchman’s coaching facilitates—but there was so little urgency, so little attacking impetus.

It repeatedly brought to mind a quote from Marti Perarnau’s Pep Confidential: The Inside Story of Pep Guardiola’s First Season at Bayern Munich (h/t the Telegraph). Guardiola had explained why “tiki-taka” did not describe his approach:

I hate tiki-taka. Tiki-taka means passing the ball for the sake of it, with no clear intention. And it’s pointless.

Don’t believe what people say. Barça didn’t do tiki-taka! It’s completely made up! Don’t believe a word of it! In all team sports, the secret is to overload one side of the pitch so that the opponent must tilt its own defence to cope. You overload on one side and draw them in so that they leave the other side weak.

And when we’ve done all that, we attack and score from the other side. That’s why you have to pass the ball, but only if you’re doing it with a clear intention. It’s only to overload the opponent, to draw them in and then to hit them with the sucker punch. That’s what our game needs to be. Nothing to do with tiki-taka.

Van Gaal played tiki-taka, in the pejorative sense. Those overloads were not created. One of the reasons for this was how often both deep-lying midfielders were stationed behind the ball, even when United were in possession.

Having one or both of those players—assuming Mourinho plays 4-2-3-1—free to break forward more often, providing another passing option for the man on the ball, will be a tactical revelation.

At No. 10, perhaps Juan Mata and Mourinho could work together in spite of their issues at Chelsea—where, incidentally, it seemed Mourinho was not prepared to have a No. 10 freed from defensive responsibility.

There are other options. Zlatan Ibrahimovic could drop into that position, Marcus Rashford played there at youth level and Wayne Rooney, of course, remains a puzzle piece to be accommodated in spite of the lack of an obvious available slot for him.

Henrikh Mkhitaryan’s move to United has been confirmed by Borussia Dortmund (h/t Mark Critchley of  The Independent), and he is certainly an option as an attack-minded No. 10.

On the left, Anthony Martial certainly has potential to be the kind of winger who pins back opposition right-backs—that was just about the only part of United’s attack that was working under Van Gaal before Rashford’s emergence. And Luke Shaw’s return from injury means he will have the support he needs to achieve this.

Shaw was a revelation at full-back before his injury last season and is a virtual archetype for a contemporary left-back: defensively sound with the physical attributes and technical ability required to contribute in attack. His presence will allow Martial a lot of freedom.

And all this should mean Mourinho’s game plan can be executed. It should also mean United’s defence is more solid when the midfield are not offering constant protection. Daley Blind’s role in the side as a play-making centre-back will surely be revised under the new manager, who will likely want to assemble a much more solid centre-back pairing.

When Chelsea beat City at the Etihad in February 2014, Jonathan Wilson broke down the tactics for the Guardian, taking a look at how Chelsea’s centre-backs operated. He wrote: 

Sides such as Bayern Munich and Barcelona deny opponents access to that key sector by pressing high up the pitch, squeezing them back in their own half and then denying them possession. Chelsea do it with guards, stationing [John] Terry and Gary Cahill within the zone—one of the reasons Terry suddenly looks so good again is that he is defending deep, playing with with the game in front of him so his lack of pace and consequent vulnerability to balls played behind him is no longer an issue.

Eric Bailly has already arrived, and it would not be a surprise to see another guard-type defender brought in to play alongside Chris Smalling. Blind will be moved on or used as the kind of utility man he was during 2014-15.

At the tail end of that season, United faced Chelsea. The Red Devils were resurgent. Van Gaal’s influence had finally begun to be felt and United were playing some free-flowing, attack-minded possession football.

They had won four games in a row, which included victories against Manchester City and Liverpool, and they had put themselves in pole position for Champions League qualification. But then they ran into Mourinho’s Chelsea. United dominated possession but lost 1-0.

As Nick Miller observed for ESPN FC at the time: 

Rooney and Van Gaal may think their team dominated the 90 minutes, but that very much depends on your definition of domination. If it means having the majority of the ball and some nice stats, then the United men can take comfort. If it means whose plan did the game most resemble, then Jose Mourinho takes home the moral victory as well as the actual one. United may have controlled possession of the ball, but it was Chelsea who controlled the game.

Van Gaal’s United never again hit a patch of form like they did in the spring of 2015. Almost every other manager in the league adopted the approach Mourinho had done, and Van Gaal never seemed to find a way to beat it.

Now the Red Devils will be the ones using the Mourinho game plan. They will be the ones more likely to hamper their opposition and use counter-attacking as their primary weapon.

To a fanbase worn down by tiki-taka, passing for the sake of passing and possession for the sake of possession, it will likely come as a welcome tactical change.

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